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Abstract
We consider the problem of Probably Ap-
proximate Correct (PAC) learning of a bi-
nary classier from noisy labeled exam-
ples acquired from multiple annotators
(each characterized by a respective clas-
sication noise rate). First, we consider
the complete information scenario, where
the learner knows the noise rates of all the
annotators. For this scenario, we derive
sample complexity bound for the Mini-
mum Disagreement Algorithm (MDA) on
the number of labeled examples to be ob-
tained from each annotator. Next, we
consider the incomplete information sce-
nario, where each annotator is strategic
and holds the respective noise rate as a
private information. For this scenario, we
design a cost optimal procurement auc-
tion mechanism along the lines of Myer-
son's optimal auction design framework
in a non-trivial manner. This mechanism
satises incentive compatibility property,
thereby facilitating the learner to elicit
true noise rates of all the annotators.
1 Background
In supervised learning, it is usually assumed that
the training set is sampled i.i.d. from some xed
distribution, and the true labels are readily avail-
able. In contrast to this, there are many real-world
applications in which obtaining true labels is a time
consuming or costly process. However, for such ap-
plications, acquiring non-expert labels is easy, fast,
and inexpensive. Web based crowdsourcing [Howe,
2008] platforms like Rent-A-Coder and Galaxy Zoo
allow any web-user to perform various data an-
notation tasks. Amazon's Mechanical Turk allow
any individual to publish a crowdsourcing task. In
such cases, labels obtained from such sources are
typically noisy, as the annotators can be careless
or even deceitful. Further, the annotators can act
strategically if it helps them fetch better rewards.
The problem of learning with noisy labeled ex-
amples has been studied mostly in two dier-
ent contexts: (1) studying the learnability of the
problem and developing learning algorithms un-
der the PAC learning framework [Valiant, 1984],
[Angluin and Laird, 1988], [Aslam and Decatur,
1996], [Blum et al., 1994], [Decatur and Gennaro,
1995], [Decatur, 1997], [Kearns, 1993], [Littlestone,
1991], and (2) estimating the noise rates of
the annotators and building robust classier
models (independent or joint estimation and
learning) [Dawid and Skene, 1979], [Raykar et al.,
2009], [Yan et al., 2010], [Donmez et al., 2010].
In the former context, most of the work has
been done in a single noisy annotator scenario
with dierent kinds of noise models including
Malicious Noise [Valiant, 1985], [Kearns and Li,
1993], [Goldman and Sloan, 1995] and Nasty Noise
[Bshouty et al., 2002]. In the latter context,
the focus has been mainly using dierent clas-
sier models and presenting dierent noise rate
estimation techniques. Our work diers from
these works in the following way: (1) we ex-
tend PAC learning sample complexity bound
results to the multiple noisy annotators sce-
nario as this problem is becoming more preva-
lent in recent times [Dekel and Shamir, 2009a],
[Dekel and Shamir, 2009b], and (2) we design an
optimal auction mechanism that facilitates elicit-
ing (instead of estimating) true noise rates from
the annotators followed by a cost-eective pur-
chase of labeled examples satisfying the PAC learn-
ing constraint. We assume that annotators know
their true noise rate. This is practical in many
scenarios, e.g. many litigation service providing
companies outsource document labeling tasks to
paralegal agencies who in turn hire human edi-
tors. These agencies know the competence level
of the editors through long standing relationship.
The agencies bid for securing outsourcing contract
while fully knowing the quality of its editors. The
closest work in this direction is due to [Dekel et al.,
2008] where they have focused on regression prob-
lem and took the elicitation approach via pro-
viding incentives to know the distribution infor-
mation (privately held by the agents for evalua-
tion). In contrast, our work is classication fo-
cused; furthermore, unlike the noisy annotators
who charge labeling cost in our scenario, the strate-
gic agents do not charge any price for annota-
tion in their case. Instead, in their model, the
agents have other vested interest in inuencing the
outcome of the learning; similar framework has
also been used in [Meir et al., 2008], [Meir et al.,
2009], [Dalvi et al., 2004], [L'Huillier et al., 2009],
and [Kantarcioglu et al., 2008]. The main contri-
butions of our work are:
 We consider the problem of PAC learning a
binary classier using noisy labeled examples
obtained from multiple noisy annotators (in
contrast to the conventional single noisy an-
notator scenario). We introduce the notion of
annotation plan, and derive sample complex-
ity bounds for PAC learning of nite concept
class using the well-known minimum disagree-
ment algorithm (MDA), in the known noise
rates information scenario.
 We present an optimal auction mechanism
to purchase labeled examples from strategic
noisy annotators by eliciting true noise rate
information in a more realistic scenario of un-
known noise rates. Our approach is inspired
by Myerson's Nobel prize winning work on op-
timal auction design [Myerson, 1981]. We de-
rive allocation and payment rules for purchas-
ing labeled examples at a near-optimal cost
from strategic noisy annotators, satisfying the
PAC constraint. To the best of our knowledge
there has been no prior art with such results.
2 PAC Learning and Bounds
In this section, we provide basic denitions re-
lated to the PAC learning model [Valiant, 1984],
[Angluin and Laird, 1988] with n noisy annotators,
and derive sample complexity bounds for PAC
learning with n noisy annotators. The PAC learn-
ing model comprises of an instance space X and a
concept class C . The instance space X is a xed
set which can be nite, countably innite, f0; 1gd,
or Rd for some d  1. The concept class C is a
set of concepts. A concept c is a subset of X ,
which can equivalently be expressed as a boolean
function from X to f0; 1g, and it should be clear
from the context whether c is referring to a sub-
set or to a function. The task of the learner is to
determine a close approximation to an unknown
target (or true) concept ct, from the labeled ex-
amples. We assume that ct 2 C . The learner has
access to n noisy annotators as the sources of its
training data. Each call to an annotator returns
a labeled example hx; yi, where instance x 2X is
drawn randomly and independently according to
some unknown (to the learner) sampling distribu-
tion D. The learner gets mi  0 labeled exam-
ples from annotator i, where i = 1; : : : ; n, which
together constitute the training dataset. Finally,
the learner employs a learning algorithm to out-
put a hypothesis h 2 C , based on the training
data. The annotator i; (i = 1; : : : ; n) reports the
label y which is subject to an independent random
mistake with a known probability i. So, the re-
ported label is y = : ct(x) with probability i and
y = ct(x) with probability (1   i). This noise
model is known as random classication noise and
was rst studied by [Angluin and Laird, 1988] and
[Laird, 1988] for the single noisy annotator case.
The probability i; i = 1; : : : ; n is known as noise
rate of the annotator i. In this paper, we assume
that 0 < i < 1=2; i = 1; : : : ; n.
2.1 PAC learning with n noisy annotators
For any hypothesis h 2 C , the error rate (or gen-
eralization error) is dened to be the probability
that h(x) 6= ct(x) for an instance x 2 X that is
randomly drawn according to D. The error rate
of a hypothesis h is given by PD(cth), where
cth  X is the symmetric dierence between
sets ct and h, and PD() is the probability of this
event (calculated with respect to D). A hypothesis
h is said to be -bad if its error rate is more than
, i.e. PD(cth) > . In the classical PAC model
of [Valiant, 1984], the learner's goal is to come up
with a learning algorithm which outputs an -bad
hypothesis h with probability at most , where the
probability is dened with respect to the distribu-
tion of training examples of a xed size. Such a
learning algorithm is known as PAC learning algo-
rithm. In general, the error rate of the hypothesis
chosen by a learning algorithm critically depends
on the number of training examples supplied to
the algorithm. Thus, a learning algorithm with
single annotator is said to satisfy PAC bound with
respect to the sample size m(; ) if the following
condition holds true: Pm(;)(PD(cth) > ) < ,
where h is the hypothesis output by the learning
algorithm when trained on the m(; ) number of
training examples. The sample size m(; ) is a
non-negative integer valued function of the param-
eters  and . The probability Pm(;)() is taken
over the distribution of m(; ) training examples
(noisy or non-noisy). For a given algorithm, the
smallest sample size m(; ) for which it still sat-
ises PAC bound is known as its sample complex-
ity. Now, we extend the PAC learning framework
to the case of n noisy annotators; starting with the
following denitions:
 An instance of the PAC learning problem is
a set of specications of instance space X ,
concept class C , true concept ct, and sampling
distribution D.
 An annotation plan, denoted by m(; ) =
(m1(; ); : : : ;mn(; )), is a vector of sample
sizes (number of examples) annotated by the
n annotators. This quantity is analogous to
sample size m(; ) in the single annotator
case. In rest of the paper, we use mi and
mi(; ); i = 1; 2; : : : ; n, interchangeably.
 A learning algorithm for n noisy annotators
is said to satisfy PAC bound for annotation
planm = (m1; : : : ;mn) if following holds true:
P(m1;:::;mn)(PD(cth) > ) <  (1)
Note that the noise rates 1; : : : ; n of the annota-
tors could be very dierent. Hence the PAC bound
depends not just on
Pn
i=1mi, but on the individ-
ual numbers m1; : : : ;mn also. This motivates us
to dene the notions of feasible and infeasible
annotation plans, as:
 For a given learning algorithm, an annotation
plan m = (m1; : : : ;mn) is said to be feasible
if the learning algorithm satises PAC bound
(1) for every instance of the problem when
training data is supplied as per this plan.
 Given an algorithm, an annotation plan m =
(m1; : : : ;mn) is said to be infeasible if the al-
gorithm fails to satisfy PAC bound (1) for at
least one instance of the problem when train-
ing data is supplied as per this plan.
2.2 Feasible annotation plans for MDA
In this section, we consider a simple learning algo-
rithm, namely Minimum Disagreement Algorithm
(MDA) and derive PAC learnability bound on an-
notation plan complexity for this algorithm in the
presence of n noisy annotators. [Laird, 1988] an-
alyzed this algorithm for single noisy annotator
case. MDA outputs the hypothesis h, which min-
imizes the empirical loss, Le(h), on the training
dataset. We describe MDA for multiple annota-
tors, below.
Algorithm 1 (MDA) Let D = fhxij ; yiji i =
1; : : : ; n; j = 1; : : : ;mig be the input training data,
where hxij ; yiji is supplied by annotator i in jth call.
The empirical loss Le(h) for hypothesis h is given
as:
Le(h) =
nX
i=1
miX
j=1
1(h(xij) 6= yij) (2)
where 1() is an indicator variable. Output hypoth-
esis h 2 C , such that Le(h)  Le(h);8h 2 C
(use any tie breaking rule).
Next we derive a characterization of feasible an-
notation plans for MDA. For this, we dene a few
events and their corresponding probabilities, as-
suming a nite concept class C having jC j = N <
1. The events are dened for an annotation plan
(m1; : : : ;mn) and a hypothesis h. We assume that
mi samples of x
i are drawn randomly and inde-
pendently, according to the distribution D by an-
notator i, and labels yi are ipped independently
with noise rates i. The events E1; E2; E3; and E4,
of our interest are dened as:
 E1(h;m1; : : : ;mn): The empirical error of a
given hypothesis h 2 C is no more than the
empirical error of the true hypothesis ct, i.e.
Le(h)  Le(ct).
 E2(h;m1; : : : ;mn): The empirical error of a
given hypothesis h 2 C is the minimum across
all hypotheses in the class C , i.e. Le(h) 
Le(h
0) 8h0 2 C .
 E3(h;m1; : : : ;mn): MDA outputs a given hy-
pothesis h.
 E4(;m1; : : : ;mn): MDA outputs an -bad
hypothesis.
The probabilities of events Ei; i = 1; 2; 3
and E4 are denoted by P(m1;:::;mn)[Ei(h)] and
P(m1;:::;mn)[E4()], respectively. Next, we show the
following useful lemmas:
Lemma 1 Given a concept class C such that ct 2
C and N = jC j, the following holds true for any
given annotation plan (m1; : : : ;mn):
P(m1;:::;mn)[E4()]  (N   1)
max
h 2 C ; h is -bad P
(m1;:::;mn)[E1(h)]

Proof: By denition of the events, for any hy-
pothesis h 2 C that is -bad (for any  > 0),
we have E3(h;m1; : : : ;mn)  E2(h;m1; : : : ;mn) 
E1(h;m1; : : : ;mn). Also, E4(;m1; : : : ;mn) =S
h2C ;h is -badE3(h;m1; : : : ;mn). The lemma fol-
lows from taking probabilities of these events.
Q.E.D.
Now, we state our main result regarding character-
ization of the feasible annotation plans for MDA.
Figure 1: Probability Tree for ct and h.
Theorem 1 Consider the PAC learning model
with n noisy annotators and the MDA (Algorithm
1). Let N = jC j < 1. Then, for any given
0 < ;  < 1 and 0 < i < 1=3; i = 1; : : : ; n,
if mi; i = 1; : : : ; n, satisfy the following inequality
then the MDA will satisfy PAC bound.
log(N=) 
nX
i=1
mi (i) (3)
where  (i) = log [1   (1  exp ( (1  3i)=8))] 1
for i = 1; : : : ; n
Remark: The inequality (3) characterizes a subset
of the feasible annotation plans. This characteri-
zation is independent of the problem instance and
the tie breaking rule of the MDA.
Proof: MDA satises PAC bound i there ex-
ists an annotation plan (m1; : : : ;mn) such that
P(m1;:::;mn)[E4()] < . From Lemma 1, it can be
seen that for any 0 < ;  < 1, if an annotation plan
(m1; : : : ;mn) satises the following condition, then
MDA will satisfy PAC bound.
max
h is -bad
P(m1;:::;mn)[E1(h)]

 =N (4)
Notice a change in the LHS expression as com-
pared to Lemma 1. The LHS in the above expres-
sion is an upper bound for the RHS of the expres-
sion in Lemma 1 (excluding N 1), because here h
may not belong to C . This makes the bound inde-
pendent of the problem instance, although MDA
will only output h 2 C . Now, we upper bound the
LHS of (4). To do this, we derive an upper bound
for P(m1;:::;mn)[E1(h)] when hypothesis h has an
error rate of  (for any  2 (0; 1)).
To derive this bound, we note that for any random
and independent sample (x; y) that is delivered by
an annotator i, the probability of its agreeing (or
disagreeing) with hypotheses ct and h (having er-
ror rate ) is given by a probability tree shown
in Figure 1. From the tree, it can be seen that
P(m1;:::;mn)[E1(h)] is same as the probability that
the number of samples that fall under leaf B in the
probability tree is at most the number of samples
that fall under leaf A.
To compute the above quantity, rst we com-
pute the conditional probability, Pk1;:::;kn(Le(h) 
Le(ct)), dened as: if ki examples, (0  ki  mi),
from annotator i (i = 1; : : : ; n) come from the set
(cth), then the probability that empirical error
of h (given by Le(h)) is less than or equal to em-
pirical error of ct (given by Le(ct)).
Consider the random variable Zji ; i = 1; : : : ; n j =
1; : : : ; ki, which is the indicator of whether j
th
sample from ith annotator is from leaf node B,
given that all the data points are from cth re-
gion. Thus, P(Zji = 1) = (1   i) and P(Zji =
0) = i. Let Z =
Pn
i=1
Pki
j=1 Z
j
i . Then the
event Le(h)  Le(ct) is same as the event Z Pn
i=1 ki=2. Hence, we are interested in nding an
upper bound on P(Z  Pni=1 ki=2). We can use
the multiplicative form of Cherno bound (see e.g.
Theorem 4.2 in [Motwani and Raghavan, 1995]),
which says P[Z  (1  )]  exp( 2=2), where
 = E[Z] =
Pn
i=1(1   i)ki. Hence, by letting
 =
Pn
i=1 ki(1 2i)
2
Pn
i=1 ki(1 i) , we get the following bound:
P(k1;:::;kn)(Le(h)  Le(ct))  e
 (Pni=1 ki(1 2i))2
8
Pn
i=1
ki(1 i)
Simplifying this bound, for 0  i  1=3 we get:
P(k1;:::;kn)(Le(h)  Le(ct))  e
 Pni=1 ki(1 3i)
8 (5)
Summing up the above conditional probability
bound over all possible values of ki, the total prob-
ability P(m1;:::;mn)[E1(h)] becomes:
m1X
k1=0
  
mnX
kn=0
 
nY
i=1

mi
ki

ki(1  )mi ki

(6)
P(k1;:::;kn)(Le(h)  Le(ct))

Using the bound in (5), we get the following upper
bound on P(m1;:::;mn)[E1(h)]:
nY
i=1
 
miX
ki=0

mi
ki

ki(1  )mi ki exp ( ki(1  3i)=8)
!
Using the moment generating function of the Bi-
nomial distribution, the bound becomesQn
i=1 [1  (1  exp( (1  3i)=8))]mi
In above bound, h has an error rate exactly equal
to . However, this bound is valid for an -bad
hypothesis also because the expression decrease as
 increases. Substituting this upper bound on the
LHS of (4), we get the desired claim. Q.E.D.
Note that the Theorem 1 is valid only for the
range of 0 < i < 1=3. However, we can extend
the denition of  () to the boundary points in
a manner that the same relation (3) holds true.
For this, observe that minimum number of exam-
ples required from a single non-noisy annotator
would be m0 = log(N=)= log [1  ] 1. This is be-
cause in such a case, we have P(Le(h)  Le(ct) j
x 2 cth) = 0 and P(x 62 cth) = (1   ).
Hence, we can let  (0) = log [1  ] 1. Also, we
let  (1=3) = log [1   (1  exp( (1=18)))] 1 and
m1=3 = log(N=)= (1=3) from [Laird, 1988].
3 Cost Optimal Mechanism Design
for PAC Learning
We consider the problem of procuring a feasible an-
notation plan when the learner needs to pay anno-
tators for their eorts, under known and unknown
noise rate scenarios. In the unknown noise rate sce-
nario, we propose an auction model and present an
optimal auction mechanism.
We assume that each annotator i (with noise rate
i) incurs an internal cost c(i) of annotation for
labeling one data point; note that the cost is de-
pendent on the noise rate, and the cost function
is same for all the annotators. The cost function
is assumed to be a bounded, continuously dier-
entiable, strictly decreasing function in 0  i <
1=2 8 i = 1; : : : ; n. If an annotator is more compe-
tent (i.e. less noisy) then he can make more money
by selling his services and time to somewhere else
in the market, which translates to saying that his
internal cost of annotation is high.
Consider a simplistic scenario of complete infor-
mation where the learner knows noise rates of
all the annotators. In such a case, the goal of
the learner is purchase an annotation plan m =
(m1;m2; : : : ;mn) in such a way that the procure-
ment cost (that is, cost of annotation), given byPn
i=1mic(i), is minimized subject to the PAC
learning constraint (3). This is an integer linear
programming problem. An approximate solution
can be obtained by relaxing the integer constraint
and rounding o the optimal solution to the near-
est integer value.
Now, let us consider a more realistic scenario of
incomplete information where the learner does not
know noise rates  = (1; : : : ; n). There are two
possible approaches: (1) estimation, and (2) elic-
itation. In the estimation approach, the learner
estimates i using previously acquired examples
(say, for example, comparing labels from dier-
ent annotators). In the elicitation approach, the
learner gets i directly from the annotators. The
former approach has the disadvantage that poor
estimates result in either paying more (when over-
estimated) or not satisfying the PAC bound (when
underestimated). Due to this reason, we are inter-
ested in elicitation. In this approach, the learner
pays an incentive (a.k.a. price of information) to
get i from the annotators. Note that the learner
needs to pay this price of information to elicit true
noise rates. (Otherwise, the annotators can falsely
report the noise rate.) For this purpose, we pro-
pose to design a procurement auction mechanism
to procure a feasible annotation plan with mini-
mum cost; now, the procurement cost also includes
the price of information. This problem is challeng-
ing because from annotator's perspective, he would
like to maximize his utility (i.e., the payment re-
ceived minus the internal cost for annotation). The
choice of mechanism depends crucially on various
design parameters such as N; ; ; i; c(), and the
choice of the learning algorithm. We assume that
N; ; ; c(), and the choice of the learning algo-
rithm are public knowledge, and only i is the pri-
vate information of ith annotator.
3.1 Procurement Auction Model
The learner solicits simultaneous and condential
bids for the noise rates from annotators. Let ^i
be the bid of ith annotator that can possibly be
a false noise rate. Assume that annotator i draws
his true noise rate i in an independent random
manner using a density function i in the inter-
val Ii = [0; 1=3] with the corresponding cumulative
distribution function (i), and let i(i) > 0 for all
i 2 Ii and i = 1; 2; : : : ; n. Let I = I1I2: : :In
and  = 1  2 : : :  n denote respective joint
spaces. We use the subscript  i to exclude ith an-
notator in any variable (e.g. I i;  i) and, we also
use the notation ^ = (^i; ^ i).
After receiving the bids (i.e. ^ = (^1; : : : ; ^n)),
the learner allocates a contract of supplying certain
number of labeled examples to each annotator and
an associated payment. Thus, a procurement auc-
tion mechanism is a pair of mappings M = (a; p),
where a : I 7! Nn0 1 is the allocation rule and
p : I 7! Rn is the payment rule.
Given an auction mechanism M = (a; p), an an-
notator i, having noise rate i, gets the following
utility when all the annotators report their bids ^:
ui(^; i) = pi(^)  ai(^)c(i) (7)
Note that the rst and the second term denote the
payment received from the learner and the inter-
nal cost in supplying the labeled examples, respec-
tively. Since each annotator i does not know  i
and moreover, others' bids ^ i aect his utility,
it is useful to dene expected allocation rule 
and the expected payment rule  for any mech-
anism M = (a; p) in the following manner (from
ith annotator's perspective).
i(^i) =
Z
I i
ai(^i; ^ i) i(^ i)d^ i (8)
i(^i) =
Z
I i
pi(^i; ^ i) i(^ i)d^ i (9)
The expected utility of annotator i, when he bids
^i while having true value i, can now be given by
Ui(^i; i) = i(^i)  i(^i)c(i) (10)
When both arguments in (10) are same, we use
Ui(i) to mean Ui(i; i) (for notational simplic-
ity). Given this background, we rst present sev-
eral denitions that are essential to prove our re-
sults. A Mechanism M = (a; p) is said to be:
1The symbol N0 denotes the set of natural numbers
inclusive of zero. The allocation and the payment rules
are functions of N; ; ; c(), and the algorithm. For
notational simplicity, we drop these parameters.
 Dominant Strategy Incentive Compati-
ble (DSIC) if for every annotator i and for ev-
ery possible true noise rate i 2 Ii, the utility
u() is maximized when ^i = i irrespective of
what others are bidding, i.e., ui(i; ^ i; i) 
ui(^i; ^ i; i) 8 ^i 2 Ii; ^ i 2 I i.
 Bayesian Incentive Compatible (BIC) if
for every annotator i and for every possible
true noise rate i 2 Ii, the expected utility
Ui() is maximized when ^i = i, i.e., Ui(i) 
Ui(^i; i) 8^i 2 Ii. Note, any mechanism
satisfying DSIC will also satisfy BIC but the
other way is not necessarily true.
 PAC compatible if the annotation plan pro-
cured by this mechanism satises the PAC
bound condition (3) whenever all the an-
notators report their true noise rates, i.e.,
log(N=) Pni=1 ai() (i).
 Individually Rational (IR) if no annotator
loses (in expected sense) anything by report-
ing true noise rates, i.e., i(i) i(i)c(i) 
0 8 i 2 Ii.
Our goal is to design a procurement auction mech-
anism that satises BIC, PAC Compatibility, and
IR properties; and minimizes the expected cost of
procurement for the learner. We call such an auc-
tion mechanism as Optimal Auction for Data La-
beling. Our design is inspired from the Nobel Prize
winning work of Roger Myerson on optimal auction
design [Myerson, 1981]. For a comprehensive treat-
ment of this topic, readers are referred to [Krishna,
2002] and [Mishra, 2008].
3.2 Characterization of Incentive
Compatibility
To design an optimal auction mechanism for data
labeling problem, we need to rst characterize the
space of auction rules that satisfy BIC property.
For this, we begin with the following denitions.
An allocation rule a is said to be:
 weakly monotone (WM) if for every an-
notator i and for every ^ i 2 I i, we have
ai(i; ^ i)  ai(^i; ^ i) for all i; ^i 2 Ii, with
i > ^i.
 weakly monotone in expectation
(WME) if for every annotator i and for
every i; ^i 2 Ii with i > ^i, we have
i(i)  i(^i).
[Myerson, 1981] showed that BIC is characterized
by the WME allocation rules in the setting of single
object auction. Interestingly, a similar characteri-
zation holds in our problem setting also. We state
this result as an important theorem.
Theorem 2 A Mechanism M = (a; p) is a BIC
mechanism i (i) the allocation rule a() is WME,
and (ii) the expected payment rule () satises:
i(i) = i + i(i)c(i)  zi(i) (11)
where i = i(0)   i(0)c(0) and zi(i) =R i
0
i(ti)c
0(ti)dti.
Proof: Suppose M = (a; p) is a BIC mecha-
nism. Then, we show that the allocation rule is
WME and (11) holds. Consider an annotator i
and i; ^i 2 Ii with i > ^i. Then, it follows
from (10) and BIC that i(i)   i(i)c(i) 
i(^i)   i(^i)c(i) and i(^i)   i(^i)c(^i) 
i(i)   i(i)c(^i). Adding these two inequal-
ities, we get [i(i)  i(^i)] [c(^i)  c(i)]  0.
Since i > ^i and c() is a strictly decreasing
function, this implies that i(i)  i(^i) (i.e.
i is non-decreasing). Now, since M is BIC,
for every i; ^i 2 Ii, we have Ui(i)  Ui(^i)  
i(^i) [ci(i)  ci(^i)]. This is obtained from
adding and subtracting ic(^i) to Ui(^i; i) (Equa-
tion (10)) and rearranging the terms. Similarly,
switching the roles of i and ^i, we get Ui(^i) 
Ui(i) i(i) [ci(^i)  ci(i)]. On combining these
two inequalities, we get  i(i) [ci(^i)  ci(i)] 
Ui(^i)   Ui(i)   i(^i) [ci(^i)  ci(i)]. Now,
by dividing with (^i   i) and letting ^i ! i, the
two-sided inequality implies that  i()c0() is the
derivative of Ui(). Since c0() is continuous and
i() is non-decreasing, the function i()c0() has
nitely many points of discontinuity and hence is
Riemann integrable in the interval [0; 1=3]. Thus,
we have
R i
0
 i(ti)c0(ti)dti = Ui(i)   Ui(0). On
substituting Ui(i) = i(i)   i(i)c(i) and
Ui(0) = i(0)  i(0)c(0), we get (11).
Now, suppose that a is WME and (11) holds.
We will show that M = (a; p) is a BIC mecha-
nism. For any annotator i and any i; ^i 2 Ii, we
have i(i)   i(^i) = i(i)c(i)   i(^i)c(i) +
i(^i) [c(i)  c(^i)]   zi(i) + zi(^i). Using the
facts i() is non-decreasing and c0()  0, it can be
shown that i(^i) [c(i)  c(^i)]  zi(i)+ zi(^i) 
0. Therefore,i(i)   i(^i)  i(i)c(i)  
i(^i)c(i) which is the condition for BIC. Q.E.D
A similar characterization result can be derived for
the DSIC case also. Due to lack of space, we skip
the results. Note that Theorem (2) suggests that
the learner can only increase the contract size with
higher noise rate. This is a bit counter intuitive as
the learner is buying more examples from a more
noisy annotator (in a relative sense). However, this
is essentially the key to enforce truthful elicitation
of the noise rates. Even if an annotator misreports
higher noise rate to get a bigger size contract, the
payment rule would make sure that the additional
payment is not enough to cover the cost of label-
ing the required additional examples. A similar
argument holds for the other direction as well.
3.3 Optimal Auction Mechanism
We pose the optimization problem of designing the
auction mechanism as follows:
min
a();p()
(a; p) =
Xn
i=1
Z 1=3
0
i(ti)i(ti)dti s:t: (12)
i() is non-decreasing (13)
i(i) = i + i(i)c(i)  zi(i) 8i 2 Ii; 8i (14)
i(i)  i(i)c(i) 8i 2 Ii; 8i (15)
log(N=) 
X
i
ai(i;  i) (i) 8(i;  i) 2 I (16)
Note that the objective function (12) constitutes
the total expected payment made to all the an-
notators. The constraints (13) and (14) are BIC
constraints, (15) is the IR constraint, and (16)
is the PAC compatibility constraint. Recall, c()
is a strictly decreasing function. If (14) is sat-
ised then (15) will be satised i i  0 (i.e.
i(0)  i(0)c(0)) 8i. Because our goal is to min-
imize (12), we must set i = 0. Then, by setting
i = 0 and using the denition of i(), we can
rewrite the objective function after some algebraic
manipulations as:
(a; p) =
Z
I
Xn
i=1
vi(xi)ai(x)

(x)dx (17)
where vi(i) = c(i)   1 i(i)i(i) c0(i) is called as
virtual cost function. Note that since c0(i) is
negative, i() > 0 for all i and for all i 2 Ii, the
virtual cost function is always non-negative, well
dened and is higher than c(i). Note that (17)
is essentially a function of the allocation rule a()
since p() is dictated by a() via (14). We need
to minimize (17) subject to the constraints (13)
and (16). It seems dicult to solve this problem,
particularly with the constraint (13) without im-
posing additional regularity condition. To arrive
at this condition, we consider solving (17) by ig-
noring the constraint (13) momentarily. So, we
consider minimizing (17) subject to the constraint
(16) alone for the moment. Note, for minimizing
(17), it suces to minimize
Pn
i=1 vi(i)ai() for
every possible prole  subject to the constraint
(16). For a xed , this is an integer linear pro-
gramming (ILP) problem whose approximate solu-
tion can be obtained by relaxing the integer con-
straint and rounding o the optimal solution to
the nearest integer value. This approximate solu-
tion is a near-optimal way of purchasing examples
from noisy annotators for PAC learning (ignoring
(13)). By looking at the dual of such a relaxed LP,
one can verify that in this near-optimal scheme, the
learner should purchase dlog(N=)= (i)e number
of examples from only that annotator, say i, for
whom the ratio vi(i)= (i) is the minimum. Let
us call this rule as theminimum allocation rule
whose approximation guarantee is given below.
Theorem 3 Let ALG be the total cost of purchase
incurred by the min allocation rule. Let OPT be
the optimal value of the ILP and m0 be non-noisy
sample complexity. Then, we must have
ALG  OPT + vi(i)  OPT (1 + 1=m0) (18)
Proof: The optimal solution of the linear re-
laxation is always a lower bound on the opti-
mal solution of the ILP. Therefore, we must have
log(N=)vi(i)= (i)  OPT . This implies
ALG = vi(i)dlog(N=)= (i)e
 log(N=)vi(i)= (i) + vi(i)
 OPT + vi(i) (19)
To get the other bound, note that the number
of examples suggested by the minimum allocation
rule is at least as much as m0. Therefore, we must
have log(N=)= (i)  m0. Thereby, we get:
OPT  log(N=)vi(i)= (i)  m0 vi(i) (20)
Substituting the bound on vi(i) from (20) into
(19) will give us the second term. Q.E.D
Regularity Condition: So far, we considered the
approximate optimal auction mechanism design
without the constraint (13). Therefore, the min-
imum allocation rule need not satisfy the WME
property. However, it is WME under the regu-
larity condition that vi()= () is a non-increasing
function. Under this condition, as i increases, the
annotator i remains the winner if he/she is already
the winner (with an increased contract size) or be-
comes the winner as per the minimum allocation
rule. Therefore, the allocation rule satises the
WM property (hence, WME). This implies that
the allocation rule would give an approximate op-
timal mechanism satisfying BIC + IR+ PAC com-
patibility properties. For every (i;  i) and every
i, the associated payment rule can be given by
pi(i;  i) = ai(i;  i)c(i)  wi(i) (21)
where wi(i) =
R i
0
ai(ti;  i)c0(ti)dti. One can
verify that the corresponding expected payment
rule i() satises BIC and IR constraints. In fact,
it turns out that the minimum allocation rule and
the payment rule (21) together satisfy the DSIC
property. We skip this proof as it follows the same
line of arguments given in the proof of Theorem 2.
Simplied Payment Rule: We dene for every
annotator i, the smallest bid value sucient to win
the contract as per the minimum allocation rule as:
qi( i) = inf

^i j vi(i)
 (i)
 vj(j)
 (j)
8j 6= i

(22)
Then, the minimum allocation rule and simplied
payment rule can be written as:
ai() =
 dlog(N=)= (i)e : if i  qi( i)
0 : otherwise
(23)
pi() =
( l
log(N=)
 (i)
m
c(qi( i)) : for winner
0 : otherwise
(24)
Thus, we now have the following mechanism.
Algorithm 2 (Approx Mechanism) The
learner should choose an annotator i for whom
the score vi(i)= (i) is minimum (breaking ties
arbitrarily), and award a contract of supplying
dlog(N=)= (i)e labeled examples. The learner
must pay an amount equal to c(qi( i)) per
example to this annotator, where qi( i) denotes
the smallest noise rate bidding which the winning
annotator i still stays as the winner. The other
annotators are not paid any amount.
For the winning annotator i, we have qi( i) 
i (under the regularity condition). This implies
that c(qi( i))  c(i). Note that the right
hand side of this inequality is the cost involved
when  is known. Therefore, the learner needs to
pay some extra cost to annotators for eliciting the
true noise rates. The following theorem is now ap-
parent from the analysis done so far.
Theorem 4 Suppose the regularity condition
holds. Then, Approx Mechanism is an approxi-
mate optimal mechanism satisfying DSIC, IR, and
PAC compatibility properties. The approximation
guarantee of this mechanism is given by ALG 
OPT + vi(i)  OPT (1 + 1=m0).
Note, DSIC is a preferred condition than BIC and
DSIC implies BIC. The above result says that un-
der the regularity condition, a DSIC mechanism
comes very close to the optimal BIC mechanism.
4 Conclusion
To the best of our knowledge, this is the rst paper
to model and analyze the problem of acquiring la-
beled examples from multiple noisy strategic an-
notators for PAC learning. For such a setting, we
have proposed an approximate cost optimal auc-
tion mechanism for the unknown noise rates sce-
nario, by extending Myerson's optimal auction de-
sign framework in a non-trivial manner. As fu-
ture enhancements, (1) the assumption of nite
concept class can be relaxed by making use of
VC-dimension, (2) PAC bound can be derived for
an improved Weighted MDA (WMDA) algorithm,
where we give more importance to the samples
from less noisy annotator while computing the loss
Le(), and (3) one can design better approximate
algorithms to solve the underlying ILP problems.
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